Business cycles and compositional variation in U.S. unemployment by Berg, G.J. van den & Abbring, J.H.
Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometrie
Serie research memo
Business Cycles and compositional
Jaap H. Abbring
Gerard J. van den Berg
Jan C. van Ours
Research Memorandum 1997-20
randa
Variation in U.S. Unemployment
April 1997
applied
labour
economics
research
team
vrije Universiteit amsterdam
.
Business Cycles and Compositional
Variation in U.S. Unemployment
Jaap H. Abbring *
Gerard J. van den Berg i
Jan C. van Ours g
April 15, 1997
Abstract
In the past decades several features of U.S. unemployment dynamics
have been investigated empirically. The original focus of research was on
the duration of unemployment. In later studies the cyclicality of incidence
and duration, compositional effects  and duration dependence of the exit
rate  out  of unemployment have been investigated. Unlike the partial ap
proach  of previous studies this paper takes al1  elements of unemployment
dynamics simultaneously into account. We find that cyclical fluctuations
in unemployment are driven by variations in the incidence, individual exit
probabilities and the composition of the inflow  into unemployment. We
also  find negative duration dependence of the unemployment exit rate
which can be attributed to employers ranking workers according to the
length of their unemployment spell.
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1 Introduction
There are several ways to investigate the dynamics of unemployment. One way
is to look at a specific  point in time and consider the decomposition of unem-
ployment into the product of incidence and expected duration of unemployment.
A given stock of unemployed may originate from a range of combinations of in-
cidence and duration, with at the one extreme a combination of smal1 incidence
and long duration and at the other extreme a combination of large incidence and
short duration. Another way to investigate unemployment dynamics is to look
at the behavior of unemployment and the related unemployment dynamics over
the business cycle. Fluctuations in the number of unemployed may be caused by
variations in incidence, average duration, or  a combination of both. However,  for
a good understanding of the processes underlying unemployment dynamics, it is
insufficient  to restrict attention to a simple description of aggregate phenomena
like fluctuations in the average unemployment duration, because there are com-
peting explanations for this. One explanation is that individual unemployment
duration distributions of al1  currently unemployed are varying over time.  Alter-
natively, unemployment duration distributions may be constant at the individual
level,  in which case aggregate fluctuations are generated by variation in the com-
position of the inflow. Furthermore, the elapsed duration of the unemployment
spel1 may reduce  the probability of being hired by an employer. In that case there
is so called negative duration dependence  of the exit rate  out  of unemployment.
Finally, there may be cyclical variation in the pattern of the negative duration
dependence  which is, as wil1  be argued below, an indication of the persistente  of
unemployment .
In the past decades several elements of U.S. unemployment dynamics have
been investigated empirically. The original focus of research was on the average
duration of unemployment . Later on, other elementq  like the cyclicality of in-
cidence and duration, compositional effects, and duration dependence  have been
investigated.
The interest in average unemployment duration originates from a macroeco-
nomic  discussion about the functioning of the U.S. labor market. If unemploy-
ment is characterized by smal1 incidence and long average duration then unem-
plo.yment  displays a high amount of persistente,  which is interpreted as evidente
of labor market malfunctioning. If unemployment durations are mostly short
then they may be voluntary in nature  and the result  of rational behavior of un-
employed for whom unemployment is a transitory and productive  phase in their
labor market career. The discussion boiled down to the issue mhether unemploy-
2
ment should be modelled in terms of stocks of persons who  are unemployed for
a long period of time,  or as flows of persons who  are unemployed for fairly short
spells.
Empirical evidente  in the discussion was usually based on information from
the Current Population Survey (CPS). 1 n most studies CPS information about
elapsed unemployment durations at different points in (calendar) time was used
to calculate expected completed  durations of workers at the start of their unem-
ployment spell. ’
In the mid 1980s several CPS based studies focus on the relationship between
unemployment dynamics  and the business cycle. Sider (1985) examines the ex-
tent to which variations in unemployment reflect changes in the incidence of new
spells or changes in average  unemployment durations. According to Sider al-
most al1  cyclical unemployment resulted from changes in duration. Butler and
McDonald  ( 1 9 8 6 )  tes imate duration models separately for each  calendar year
and subsequently calculate an annual measure of inequality in the distribution
of unemployment. From t.he correlation between this measure and business cycle
indicators they conclude that during expansionary periods of the business cycle
inequality  in the distribution of unemployment decreases.2
Darby, Haltiwanger and Plant (1985) argue that systematic  cyclical variation
in the composition of the inflow into unemployment may  cause  cyclical fluctu-
ations in aggregate unemployment, even if individual unemployment duration
distributions do not change. In their theoretical model there are two groups of
workers . The first group consists of job shoppers  and is characterized by high
rates  of entry into and exit from unemployment. The second  group consists of
career  makers who  rarely become unemployed but need a lot of time  to find
a new job once  they become unemployed. In booms, few career  makers loose
their jobs and most unemployment spells are related to job shopping. In reces-
sions, however,  relatively many  career  makers are fired, and job shopping  is less
frequent. Consequently, the average exit  rate  falls quickly  when entering a reces-
sion, whereas the average  exit rate  increases slowly in a recovery from a recession.
‘For examples, see Kaitz  (1970),  Clark  and Summers (1979))  Akerlof and Main  (1980, 1981):
and Carlson and Horrigan (1983). Since the end of the 1970s duration studies based on micro
(panel and cross-section) data dominate in quantity over studies based on CPS data. The focus
in these studies has been, amongst other things, on differente;  in exit behavior between groups
of unemployed. See Devine and Kiefer (1991) for an overview.
‘It should be pointed out that the steady-state assumption they malte  is not entirely con-
sistent in the light of the fact  that they estimate separate models for each calendar year.
Moreover, their estimates of duration dependence  are determined  by the parametric functional
form assumptions  they make.
Using CPS data they estimate time series regressions with the average exit prob-
ability from unemployment as dependent variable and the lagged share of short
term unemployed, which they consider as an indicator of heterogeneity in the
inflow, as one of the explanatory variables. They find  that a high share of short
term unemployed in a specific  month increases the overall exit probability in the
next month. From this they conclude that the changing composition is indeed
an important determinant of cyclical unemployment fluctuations. Dynarski and
Sheffrin (1990),  hw o use data of the Panel Study of Income  Dynamics,  conclude
however  that changes in the composition in unemployment are not very  impor-
tant. Their conclusion is in line with Baker  (1992a). Using CPS data, Baker
shows that the variation in the composition of the inflow is insufficient  to explain
the variation in aggregate duration data, so ‘the heterogeneity explanation of
aggregate variation sheds little light on the nature  of unemployment dynamics’.
Baker  concludes that changes in individual unemployment durations are more
important than compositional changes of the inflow. From ad hoc (graphical)
checks, Imbens and Lynch (1992) obtain similar conclusions. A possible reason
for the different results is that Baker,  Dynarski and Sheffrin, and Imbens and
Lynch use direct evidente  of cyclical changes in the composition of the inflow
whereas Darby et al.  use an indicator variable which may reflect seasonal rather
than cyclical effects.
On the issue of duration dependence  there are also some studies based on CPS
data (for an overviem of the results from micro  studies, see Devine and Kiefer
(1991)). B utler and McDonald  find positive duration dependence  of the exit rate
out  of unemployment. Van den Berg and Van Ours (1996) analyze  CPS time
series of unemployment exit probabilities for different unemployment duration
classes over the period 1967-91.  They also find duration dependence.
It is not only important to establish whether or not there is negative duration
dependence  of the unemployment exit rate. It is also informative to establish
whether there is a relationship between observed duration dependence  and the
business cycle. According to Blanchard (1991) and Blanchard and Diamond
(1994) ranking by employers of unemployed workers according to the length of
their unemployment spel1 may explain the existente  of negative duration depen-
dence. Ranking is particularly influencing exit rates  of long term unemployed
in a situation of labor market slack.  In a recession applications by long term
unemployed workers wil1  be more frequently turned down for the reason that a
short term unemployed worker has applied as well.  Therefore, ranking causes
duration dependence  to be stronger during recessions and weaker during booms.
Therefore!  if there is ranking, exit rates  of long term unemployed individuals are
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more sensitive to cyclical fluctuations than exit rates  of short term unemployed
individuals. There is some empirical evidente  of differences in exit behavior be-
tween short and long term unemployed across the business cycle. According to
Sider (1985),  exit rates  are more cyclically sensitive at shorter durations, i.e. less
than 6 months. Butler and McDonald  (1986) come to an opposite conclusion.
According to them, increases in aggregate demand:  as measured by real GNP,
increase the exit rate  most among those with longer durations of unemployment.
Results from Dynarski and Sheffrin (1990) are in line with the study of Butler
and h4cDonald.  Dynarski and Sheffrin conclude that longer spells of unemploy-
ment are more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations (which they measure by
the national unemployment rate).
Al1  in all, a substantial amount of research on U.S. unemployment dynam-
ics has been carried out in the past decades. There seems to be some sort of
consensus about what is relevant in U.S. unemployment dynamics:  on average
unemployment durations are short, cyclical variation in unemployment is mainly
caused  by cyclical variation in the average unemployment duration and not by
variation in incidence, changes in the composition of the infiow  into unemploy-
ment are not very important! negative duration dependence  of the exit rate  out of
unemployment is relevant, short term and long term unemployed react  differently
to business cycle fluctuations.
Some of the previous studies use quite simple techniques  of analysis, are based
on rather  ad hoc assumptions or do not seem to have an entirely consistent
approach. Yet, there has been an evolution in research technology moving from
analyses that depended heavily on steady state  assumptions to more complex
models of unemployment dynamics  allowing for a non-steady state  environment.
However,  it is also clear  that researchers have focused on separate elements of
unemployment dynamics. What lacks is a study that takes simultaneously al1
elements of unemployment dynamics  into account.
This paper is an attempt  to fill  this gap. We give a complete empirical
overview of U.S. unemployment dynamics.  We investigate the relevante  of tradi-
tional components  like incidence, duration, inflow composition and the effects  of
the business cycle. We also investigate the phenomenon of ranking, which causes
negative duration dependence.
When  investigating the nature  of the decline of individual exit rates  over
the duration of unemployment the researcher has to take the phenomenon of
unobserved heterogeneity into account. Unobserved heterogeneity causes the ob-
served exit rate  of an apparantly homogeneous group of unemployed to decline
over the duration of unemployment, because the best qualified unemployed leave
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unemployment first. The sorting caused by heterogeneity has other cyclical impli-
cations than ranking. In the top of the cycle the exit rate  declines very rapidly.
In slumps even the best qualified unemployed find it difficult to leave unem-
ployment, and the aggregate exit rate  declines only mildly over the duration of
unemployment. So, the sorting model implies that duration dependence is less
negative in a recession than at the top of the business cycle. Because of the
differente  in cyclical behavior, the pattern of interaction between duration and
cycle is informative on the dominante  of ranking and sorting effects.3
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains the theoretical part
of the paper. Subsection 2.1 discusses sorting, ranking and duration dependence
more extensively. In Subsection 2.2 a stylized theoretical model of ranking and
sorting is discussed. In Subsection 2.3 we develop an empirical duration model
that allows for interaction between aggregate duration dependence and the busi-
ness cycle. The parameterization of this model is given in Subsection 2.4. Section
3 discusses the data set. We use aggregate CPS data on unemployment classified
by unemployment duration and a limited number of demographic characteristics.
Section 4 presents parameter estimates of our model. Subsection 4.1 summarizes
the main  results. Subsection 4.2 discusses robustness of our results with respect
to the introduction of cyclical variation in the composition of the inflow.  In
Section 5, we use the parameter estimates to evaluate the role of various effects
in explaining aggregate fluctuations in unemployment. Subsection 5.1 discusses
an elementary decomposition in incidence and duration, whereas 5.2 evaluates
duration dependence and interaction effects. Section 6 concludes.
Three appendices are added to complement the main  text with details. Ap-
pendix A derives the properties of the theoretical sorting model in Subsection
2.2. Appendix B provides details on the decomposition of Section 5. We discuss
identification in Appendix C.
2 A flexible empirical model of the dynamics in
unemployment durations
2.1 Ranking and sorting
It is a wel1  established fact  that long term unemployed have on average lower exit
rates  from unemployment than short term unemployed. In the U.S., according
“Note that we do not distinguish between the effects of sorting and ranking because we
are interested in sorting per se: but because we have to account for it in order to be able to
investigate the importante of ranlting.
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to CPS data the aggregate exit probability falls from over 50% per month in the
first month of unemployment to around 15% per month in the fifth month.
Observed negative duration dependence could be caused by negative duration
dependence at the micro  level. In a world with asymmetrie  information, high
unemployment durations may signal low worker quality, and direct links between
unemployment duration and worker productivity may  exist if skills deteriorate
when unemployed. In either case, employers prefer to hire short term unemployed
over hiring long term unemployed. Consequently, short term unemployed have
higher exit rates  into employment.
Blanchard (1991) discusses ranking as an explanation of negative duration
dependence at the individual level. Ranking reflects employers’ recruiting be-
havior. Employers prefer to hire short term unemployed workers over long term
unemployed workers, because of either the signalling effect or the loss of skills
mentioned earlier. Ranking may even occur if there is only a slight deterioration
of human  capita& because the employer stil1 prefers a short term unemployed to
a long term unemployed since the latter  has a disadvantage, be it a smal1  one.
As argued in Section  1, sorting also causes negative duration dependence of
observed exit probabilities. A crucial  differente between ranking and sorting is
that ranking is caused by variation in elapsed unemployment durations, whereas
sorting is driven by variation in innate characteristics, like ability, and char-
acteristics that can be considered given in the short run, like education. As a
result,  ranking and sorting have different dynamic  implications. In a pure sorting
model, unemployment exit rates  of short term unemployed are more sensitive to
cyclical fluctuations than exit rates  of long term unemployed (Van den Berg and
Van Ours (1994, 1996, 1997)). 1 n a pure ranking model, exit rates  of long term
unemployed are more sensitive to cyclical fluctuations than exit rates  of short
term unemployed (Blanchard (199 1) and Blanchard and Diamond  (1994)). By
studying the interaction between cyclical fluctuations and exit rates  at different
unemployment durations we can distuinguish between ranking and sorting.
This distinction is important as ranking and sorting have different allocative
and macroeconomic implications. In case of pure sorting, long term unemploy-
ment is concentrated  in certain segments of the labor market. This may be unde-
sirable and cal1  for government intervention targeted at these specific  segments.
Pure ranking, on the other hand, is not necessarily discriminative  between seg-
ments of the labor market. Instead, it is a future risk borne equally  by al1 newly
unemployed at each point in time.  It could: however,  be related to real economie
costs  of long term unemployment. If ranking is driven by loss of skills during un-
employment. prolonged spells of unemployment lead to excessive  loss of human
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capital.  Similarly, even if ranking is based on a mild loss of skills it could induce
demotivation among long term unemployed. In either case, the government may
want to direct policy to prevent the emergence of long term unemployment.
The differente  in macroeconomic implications of both models is related to the
allocative  differences. In case of ranking, newly unemployed face better employ-
ment prospects  than the currently unemployed. Thus, in labor markets  where  the
currently employed bargain over wages with employers, the presence of long term
unemployed has li ttle effect on wages. Consequently, even if ranking is based
on a mild loss  of skills it may cause  demotivation of long term unemployed and
thus considerable  persistente  in unemployment (Blanchard (1991)). In a sorting
model! however,  the presence of long term unemployed can  be expected to weaken
the effect of the leve1 of unemployment on wages, just like overall unemployment
does (Blanchard and Diamond  (1994)). A s, in this case, prolonged unemploy-
ment does not necessarily weaken  the effect of unemployment on wages, sorting
is less likely to be associated with unemployment persistente.
One may argue that, within markets,  employers rank on both unemployment
duration and skills. In that case, ranking is not rationalized by loss of skills, but
by the fact  that long term unemployed are more likely to be screened and rejected
by other employers in the same market. Formalization of this idea, however,  is
beyond the scope of this paper, and wil1  be left for future research.
2.2 A formal framework
In this subsection we provide a model framework that incorporates  both ranking
and sorting. We do not claim that this model provides a perfect description of
the labor market. Rather:  it provides a consistent description of a labor mar-
ket in which ranking and sorting can be distinguished. As such, it serves as a
benchmark model later on, when we discuss the empirical operationalization of
these concepts.  It should be stressed from the outset that this forma1 model is
not imposed on the data.
Sorting occurs if there is variation across individuals in the leve1 of the exit
rate  from unemployment. The main  assumption of this subsection is that al1
of this variation can be traced  back to labor market segmentation. We assume
that the labor market is segmented in, possibly uncountably many, unrelated
submarkets or segments and that each individual searches in only one segment.
Exit rates  from unemployment may vary between the submarkets, but within seg-
ments each individual with the same unemployment duration has the same exit
rate to employment. Clearly, both from the perspective of supply and demand
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this assumption can be criticized. For example, it seems that, in practice,  there is
no supply segmentation of the labor market in submarkets for able and less able
people, although ability  may be related to the exit rate  to employment. On the
demand  side,  one could argue!  workers from various segments may, for instance,
be complements  in the production process, which implies that hiring decisions
in the various segments may be related. Our full segmentation assumption does
not allow for such interaction between submarkets. On the other hand, it is not
unreasonable to assume that segments exist for, for example!  schooling, as!  cer-
tainly in the short run!  individuals cannot move from one schooling segment to
the other. Furthermore!  the segmentation assumption greatly facilitates the in-
troduction of ranking into the model framework. Ranking occurs if, for whatever
reason, firms prefer to hire short term unemployed. Due to the full segmentation
and homogeneity within segments, the Blanchard and Diamond  (1994) model
is directly applicable to each of the submarkets. Thus, we have ranking within
segments: and sorting between segments.4
Suppose that unemployment duration is measured on a discrete time scale
with origin 0, and denote the elapsed duration of a spel1 of unemployment for a
given individual by t.  Suppose that segments can be characterized by a scalar
7:  E (0,oc).  The probability of an individual leaving unemployment in segment v
at unemployment duration t!  conditional on survival up to duration t and state
of the business cycle c, is given by
6 (tlc, v) = q (c, t) v. (1)
The individual exit probability is proportional in ~(t,  c), which represents business
cycle and duration dependence  of individual exit probabilities, and a segment
specific  effect v. Note that q(c,  t) is common to al1 individuals within a segment
v. The distribution of individuals over the segments v reflects al1 heterogeneity
across unemployment durations, apart from random variation in these durations.
We denote the distribution function of unemployed over the segments v by G(v).
As z9(tlc,~)  is a probability, G(U) is required to satisfy Pr[O < z9(tjc,v)  < 11  =
1. Suppose that q(c,t) is differentiable with respect to c! where Q(C,  t)  > 0:
individual exit probabilities are higher at higher values of the business cycle
indicator. If employers do not rank applicants according to t,  but hire randomly,
individual exit probabilities do not change with duration: q(c,  t + 1) = q(c,  t) .
“Note  that the previous empirical literature on unemployment dynamics  does not malte
segmentation assumptions. This is because this literature is not concerned with ranking.  which
is ba+& on employers  behavior  and therefore needs  assumptions  on market structure. Our
empirical  model does however  contain the models in this  literature as special cases.
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and dlog[v(c,  t + l)/q(c:  t)]/&  = 0.’  Ranking, however, implies that individual
exit probabilities decrease during unemployment; ~(c,  t + 1) < ~(c,  t). Moreover,
within segments the labor market is homogeneous, so it follows from Blanchard
(1991) and Blanchard and Diamond  (1994) that in case of ranking:
%3 k?(c, t + w?(Ci UI > ()
dC
(2)
Thus, duration dependence caused  by ranking is less steep in a boom, when c is
relatively large. In other words, exit probabilities from unemployment are more
sensitive to business cycle fluctuations at higher durations. These are the two
faces of what we label to be positive interaction. The intuition behind this has
been discussed in Section  1 and Subsection 2.1.
Now consider the effect of sorting. The aggregate exit probability in a cohort
of workers that has become unemployed some time  t ago, in a state  of the business
cycle c! equal8
6 (tIc)  = ‘I cc> t> ZJ  cc, t) > (3)
where  V(C,  t) := IE  [UIc,  t 2 t] = lE[v(l  -  ~(~)v)~]/lEZ[(l  -  q(c)~l)~].  Note that
V(C,  0) = IE[V].  If the distribution of v is degenerate, i.e. if al1  workers are
concentrated  in a single segment, V(C,  t) = IE[v],  vC(c,  t) = 0 and V(C,  t + 1) =
V(C,  t). In this case, there is no sorting, as workers are homogeneous. Now suppose
that var(v)  > 0. Then, workers are heterogeneous, and sorting will occur and
cause  negative duration dependence at the aggregate level:  V(C,  t + 1) < V(C,  t).
In Appendix A it is shown that sorting implies that duration dependence between
durations 0 and t is steeper  in booms: dlog[v(c,  t)/v(c, O)]/& < 0 for any t > 0.
As, by implication of (2): in case of ranking
$log-  =77(G)  t Zlog  rlw  > 0c77(c:O)  i=l ac q(c,i  -  1) ’
(4
a test can be constructed from interaction between the business cycle and the
leve1 of duration dependence between duration 0 and any duration t > 0. We wil1
label this the cumulative  interaction effect. A measure of the overall cumulative
‘Note that in this subsection, at this stage, we do not yet consider other reasons  for duration
dependence, like a decreasing search intensity.
GWe  use bold fonts for random  variables and standard fonts for their realizations, only if
there is a risk of confusion. Appendix A provides  details. In Abbring, Van den Berg and
Van Ours (1997) we show that qualitatively similar results hold in the continuous time Mixed
Proportional Hazard version  of our model.
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interaction effect in our combined  ranking-sorting labor market is found by taking
the derivative with respect to c of the log exit probability at time  t!  relative to
the exit probability at time 0, as in
7-w)Elo,-- = Elog-77(C>  t> +,  t>?J(Olc) ac - s o p -dc, 0) + dc v(c, 0). (5)
The sign of the overall cumulative  interaction effect is determined by the relative
importante  of ranking and sorting. So, a test on ranking versus sorting can be
constructed from interaction data by evaluating (5) at various durations, testing
for the sign of the interaction effect at each duration. Clearly, both sorting and
ranking may occur simultaneously in the data. Then, the test merely  gives the
dominant process  up to each unemployment duration. If the test statistic  is
negative for smal1 t and positive for large t then both sorting and ranking occur.
If we abandon our stylized model of ranking and sorting, theoretical results
become less clear cut. Lebon (1993) hs ows that, in a labor market with loss of
skills during unemployment, firms are likely to rank in booms, but randomly hire
in recessions. Blanchard (1996) focuses on the effect of wage differentials between
short and long term unemployed, and concludes the opposite. In our empirical
model which we present in the next  section  we account for this by allowing for
asymmetries in interaction effects over the business cycle. Moreover, we allow for
other types of duration dependence.
2.3 Empirical model specification
In this subsection we present a flexible model for the empirical analysis of the
dynamics  in the unemployment duration distribution. This model is estimable
with CPS data. We wil1  show that it captures  the phenomena described in the
previous subsections and that it is well-suited to study the other issues discussed
in the literature.
We distinguish two discrete measures of time,  unemployment duration and
calendar time,  with the same measurement scales,  but different origins. The
duration of a spel1 of unemployment for a given individual is denoted by t and has
time  origin 0. Calendar time  is denoted by r and has time  origin ~0. Furthermore,
we distinguish demographic groups of workers, indexed by g, and denote the exit
probability from unemployment of a cohort of workers from group g after  t periods
o’f  unemployment: given that they have been unemployed for t periods at calendar
time  r by 19~  (t  Ir). We can calculate  these exit probabilities using information on
the number of individuals in group g that have been unemployed for t periods of
time  at calendar time r (U9 (t  17))  and th e number of these individuals that have
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been unemployed for tfl  periods of time at calendar time  ~+1 (U,  (t  + 1)  T + 1)  5
lJg  (W),  as
(6)
In reality, we do not exactly observe the numbers Ug  (tl~).  The CPS data we
use are based on surveys of unemployed individuals. Therefore the data contain
sampling errors. Furthermore, respondents may have difficulties recalling their
elapsed unemployment durations. In that case, they may be counted  as being
unemployed for t periods of time whereas in reality they are unemployed for t -  1
or t + 1 periods. Finally, respondents may tend to round off their duration to the
nearest natura1 unit of time like an integer number of months (see also Section
3). Deviation of unemployment figures from their true values causes deviation
of observed exit probabilities from their true values, and may even render  these
probabilities negative or larger than 1. Therefore, we wil1  allow for measurement
errors in the model. From now on we place  a tilde on top of observed values, in
contrast to true, or unobserved, values. We assume that
with
1%  kt,7 - N(O, 0;)
and independente  between the error terms. Note that we allow for heteroskedas-
ticity  between demographic groups. From this specification,  it follows that the
observed log (1 -  8g  (t  [T))  equals the sum of the true log (1 -  eg  (t  17))  and a dis-
turbance term. Thus, if we specify a model for the true hazard rates  8,,  we can
express the observed hazard rates  in terms of the ‘parameters’ and a random
disturbance term, and the model parameters can be estimated.
We assume that al1 variation in the true exit probabilities out of unemploy-
ment can be explained by demographic group g, the prevailing unemployment
duration t, calendar time T, and a genera1 interaction effect of calendar time and
duration dependence.  We use a multiplicative  specification  of the exit probability
out of unemployment with functions that represent these effects as arguments:7
47 (47) = exp (a~,~>  $1 (t)  $2  (T)  Q3 (t, T)  . (9)
‘In terms  of the  notation of Subsection 2.2 me  have that tJ9  (t1-r)  is equivalent to 8 (tic)  for
given  demographic  characteristics.  A state  c of the business cycle corresponds to a tirne interval
within  wliicli  .$9  (7)  is constant.
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Observed demographic characteristics are only allowed to affect the constant,
term in the exit probability. The function @1  (t) captures  types of individual
duration dependence that have not been discussed in the previous subsection.
like a decreasing search intensity due to a discouraged worker effect, and limited
benefit  entitlement.’  The calendar time function @Z(T)  is specified  as the product
of a seasonal term wz(  and a cyclical and trend term 7/&(7-):
,742  w = w2  (T)  +2x  (7) (10)
The genera1 interaction effect is decomposed in seasonal and cyclical effects de-
pending  on the moment of inflow, wQ  (7 -  t)  and @+(T  - t), and a specific  inter-
action  effect &+(t!  7) that represents the interaction effects that are caused by
ranking and sorting:”
743  (6  r> = w3  (T - q  7LJ3,C  (T  - t) $35 (t, T)  . (11)
We restrict the functional form of &+(t,  7) to satisfy @3,i(E!  7) = q&(t,  7)  = 1:
for some given f and 7. With the normalization imposed, q!~~,~(ir)  can  be seen as
the ‘baseline’ trend and cycle experienced by unemployed in duration class ?,  and
@l(t)  is the ‘baseline’ duration dependence experienced at calendar time  moment
7. We identify business cycle fluctuations as fluctuations in $2,C(~).  Then sorting
implies that, for t > 0, @3,+(7,t)/+3,i(~,  0) is smaller  for r for which $~(7)  is
higher,  i.e. that duration dependence is more negative in booms. In case of
ranking, the opposite holds.
‘111  Subsection 2.2 we only considered duration dependence as a result  of ranking and, on
an aggregate level, as a result  of sorting. To the extent in which other types of individual
duration dependence matter for employers, the inclusion of these would complicate  the theo-
retical model, since it is likely that employer behavior towards ranking would be affect& Here
we simply assume that these other types of duration dependence can be represented by way
of a multiplicative  term in the individual exit probabilities. Thus, we also  assume  that such
duration dependence does not vary over the business cycle. Without the latter, the interaction
effect would be affected  by the way in which this duration dependence varies over the business
cycle, and as a result  it would not be informative on ranking and sorting.
“Note  that the theoretical framework of Subsection 2.2 does not take account of functions
ws(r-t)  and $+(7--t).  In the main  empirical analysis we do not allow for $+(~-t)  either.  We
simply include the seasonal effect ws  (T-t) in the empirical specification  for reasons of flexibility.
In Subsection 4.2 below we argue that the functions wg and $3,C  can be used to a certain extent
to Capture the way in which the composition  of the infiow changes  over time in the data. In
terminology of Subsection 2.2, a changing composition of the inflow means  that the inflow of
workers attached to a certain segment D varies as a fraction  of the total inflow. It is clear  that
the functions ~3  and $~3,~ are not identified without additional restrictions. We discuss  this in
detail in the appendix and in Subsection 4.2.
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The interaction between the business cycle and duration dependence is, in its
most genera1 form, specified  as
$3,;  W = exp [<l(t)<2(~)]  , (12)
with ti(?)  = &(?)  = 0. This is an extremely genera1 specification that allows the
interaction sign to vary with duration as wel1  as with the state of the business
cycle. We clarify this specification by considering two special cases in which we
abstract from seasonal and cyclical fluctuations in the composition of the infiow
so that equation (9) becomes: $ (W = exp  (~Eo,~>  $1 (t) $2  Cd  exp  [Wt22(7)1  .
In the special cases we impose restrictions on either the duration part or the
calendar time  part of the interaction effect:
i) restriction  on the duration part of the interaction effect
Suppose that &(t) = log[(t + l)/(?+  I)], h hw ic imp lies that the interaction bas
the sarne sign in al1  duration classes. Overall duration dependence is now given
by
6 (44 $1 (t>
log lgg(()lT)  = log $$((-j)  + Jdd log (t + 1) (13)
Duration dependence between duration classes 0 and t is more negative if 52(7-)
is smaller. Thus, if $~z,~(T) and (~(7)  are positively correlated, we have positive
interaction, duration dependence is more positive in booms, and the ranking
effect dominates. If $~,~(r)  and < 2 r are negatively correlated the sorting effect( )
dominates. Similarly, the relative state  of the cycle in duration class  t is given by
log uw $2 (7)= log $47) (t + 1)uw -+~~(T)log------(t + 1) - (14)
In case of positive interaction, cycles are amplified  at higher  durations, in case of
negative interaction cycles are dampened at higher  durations.
A specification with a flexible function &(T) allows for asymmetries in the
interaction effect over the business cycle. In this example, where  the interaction
effect bas  the same sign at each  duration at a given point time,  this means  that the
interaction effect may switch sign in the course of calendar time.  Thus, ranking
effects  may  dominate at some point in time,  whereas sorting effects  may domi-
nate  at another moment. According to Blanchard (1991), this may  be a relevant
description of unemployment dynamics  in case of severe ski11 deterioration or se-
vere  worker discouragement at high durations. In a recession, durations are often
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high, and many  workers wil1  suffer such irreversible changes  in their skills or taste.
ii) restriction  on the calendar tim#e  part of the interaction effect
Suppose that & (7) = log[lc12(4/W)l tha is, the calendar time  effect in thet
interaction term is the same as  the calendar time  effect in the basic  model. Overall
duration dependence and the relative state  of the cycle are now given by
42 w Th(t) $2 (79
log  q(qr>  =  1%  g)(O)  +  ut>  - ml  log  ti2(T)  7
and
(15)
In this case, interaction effects may have different signs at different duration
classes, and cyclical sensitivity may depend  non-monotonously on duration. How-
ever, asyrnmetries  of interaction effects over the cycle are excluded by this spec-
ification.
The most flexible specification  of the interaction effect, as in equation (12),
combines both features, by allowing for both asymmetries over duration and
asymmetries over the business cycle.
The functions ws(r--t) and $+(r-t) can  be thought to represent seasonal and
cyclical fluctuations in the composition of the inflow,  where  composition refers
to composition in terms of characteristics that are related to exit probabilities.
As these functions introduce a second  type of interaction between duration and
calendar time  in our  model, the question arises  which assumptions have to be
made to identify these interaction effects. In Appendix C we discuss  identification
of our  interaction model.
2.4
The
ized
may
Paramet erizat ion
baseline  duration dependence function is fully  flexible since it is parameter-
as a step function which bas the same value within duration intervals but
differ between duration intervals:
{
W-1
$1  (t>  = exp  C 7hiIlli  (t) ,
i=o 1
(17)
in which Ii,+ (t) = 1 if t = i and 0 otherwise, and nt is the number of duration
classes considered. The seasonal effects are specified  by
(18)
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where  Is is an indicator function for season s, s = 1,. . . , S, and similarly for
w3(  T -  t). Cyclical and trend effects are represented by a flexible polynomial
of degree n. We could parameterize this polynomial in the standard way, and
specify it as being composed  of polynomial terms CQ~#, i = 0,. . . , n. However,  as
the terms r’  are not mutually orthogonal, iterative estimation of the parameters
aqi  may be slow  because of multicollinearity problems. To avoid these problems,
we use Chebyshev polynomials of the first kind. Thus, we do not construct
the polynomial from terms cl,&,  but from terms aki,  i = 0,. . . , n, where
Po(+a(T),  f * 1 ? P,~  (T)  are mutually orthogonal polynomials of indexed degree.l’
Then:  the baseline  trend and cycle 7&+(7) is specified as
We wil1  also try an alternative specification of $~(7),  in which we specify$2,c(7)  =
exp(cm  + mm(f) + P&>>, w here c(7)  is an observed indicator of the business
cycle, in particular a help wanted index.
As indicated in the previous subsection, in our baseline  analysis,  the effect on
the composition of the inflow is restricted to seasonal fluctuations.
We specify the duration part of the interaction effect, {l(t),  either by log(t+  1))
or by
(20)
The first specification has already  appeared in example  (i) of Subsection 2.3. As
log(t  + 1) is increasing at al1 t,  this specification implies that the interaction effect
has the same sign at al1 durations. If <g(7)  is tracking the cycle in the outflow,
duration dependence  will be less negative at al1 durations in the top of a cycle. If
&(7)  is flexibly specified, it could be procyclical in one and countercyclical in an
other period. Then, the interaction effect switches sign over calendar time.  This
is what we have labeled ‘asymmetry over calendar time’ earlier.
The yuadratic specification (20) is more flexible, as it allows the interaction
effect to switch sign once  over duration. For example:  if cl(t)  is U-shaped  and
“More  specifically, we first iinearly transform the calendar time domain to the domain of
orthogonality of the Chebyshev polynomial, [-1,1], by means  of
Y(T) = 23 - 1:
where  n, & the number of calendar time periods considered. The series of orthogonal poly-
nomials  is then generated  by (see Abramowitz and Stegen (1970), Table 22.3)
pk (T) = 1:  and
blpk  (T) = $ Ci~O  (-l)i $j&$  (2,i)“-2i  for i = 1,2!.  . . ,?I.
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J2(  T)  is procyclical, in booms duration dependence between consecutive  duration
classes wil1  be more negative at low durations, and more positive at high dura-
tions.  This is what we have called ‘asymmetry over duration’ earlier. From Sub-
section  2.2 we know that,  positive interaction at high durations can be induced by
both ranking and sorting. An unambiguous test can only be constructed from the
cumulative interaction effect, i.e. the variation of duration dependence between
durations 0 and t over the cycle. Therefore, we wil1  not only report estimates of
CIO := <Tl  + Ji2 ad Cl1  := 2&, but also report the resulting estimates of &(t).
El (t  + 1) - 51 (t>  = <lo + Jllt can be shown to give the interaction effect between
duration classes t and t + 1 if 52  (T) = log $2.c(7).  As can  be inferred from example
(ii) of Subsection 2.3, <l(t) g i ves the cumulative interaction effect in this case. If
[Z(T)  is Aexibly specified, the sign of the cumulative interaction effect is the sign
of ti(t) if G(T)  is p- y 1‘ 1HOC  c lca , and minus the sign of <1  (t) otherwise.
We specify the calendar time part of the interaction effect, tg(~)  : by [Z(T)  =
log $5~ (71,  or by
(21)
As is clear by now, the first specification prevents the sign of the interaction effect
to switch over calendar time. As <g(7) is, by construction, procyclical in this case,
the sign of & (t) can now directly be read as the sign of the cumulative interaction
effect. If we use specification (21) instead, interaction effects are allowed to change
sign over calendar time.  This is again asyrnmetry  over calendar time.  We have
to check the nature  of the cyclicality of &((7) b e ore  we can judge the interactionf
effect implied by <l(t).  Clearly, if <Z(T)  is procyclical, the interaction effect has
the same sign as cl(t).  Otherwise, it has the opposite sign.
For the seasonal effects we use 4 quarterly indicators. Both +2,c(~)  and, if
specified according to (21),  <z(7) are specified with n = 15.11
3  D a t a
To estimate our model we use the same data as Van den Berg and Van Ours
(1996). These data are based on unpublished CPS data from the U.S. Department
“Furthermore, we normalize wpl  = ~31  = 0. Apart from that, we normalize +l (0) = 1 ij
&O = 0, ~20  = EE: (-l)i’l as,2 i, and ~130  = crfi (-l)ii’  ~~3,2  i. The last 2 normaliza-
tions  ensure that @z.=(7)  and &+(t,  T) equal 1 in the sample mean  calendar moment, ?-’  (0).
Similarly!  we take  the help wanted  index in log deviations from  its value in the mean  calendar
time  moment. Finally.  note that we have implicitly chosen  t = 0 and 7 = i-‘(O).
of Labor, which give monthly information on unemployment by weekly duration
classes. In the analysis we use time series of monthly unemployment figures
for four groups of workers, white males,  white females, black males  and black
females, over the period January 1968-May  1992. Thus, we observe changes in
the race and gender composition of the inflow. Since the information on exit
rates  becomes more unreliable at longer durations we only use information on
exit rates  for the first six months of unemployment.
As!  for example, Sider (1985) and Baker  (1992a) pointed out,  there are several
problems connected to the use of these data. First of all: the way in which the data
are collected implies that we cannot follow actual cohorts over time.  However,
we may consider the data as synthetic cohorts. Second! the empirical analysis is
facilitated if the frequency at which the data are collected equals the sizes  of the
unemployment duration classes. We aggregate the weekly duration classes into
monthly duration classes. Finally, the data are influenced by phenomena like digit
preferences and the tendency of respondents to report ‘weeks of unemployment’
as whole  months (Baker  (1992b)). B ecause of this we made the same corrections
as in Baker  (1992a). Baker  reallocated 30 percent of the respondents at 4, 8, 12,
16 and 26 weeks, 40 percent of those at 52 weeks, and 50 percent of those at 78
and 99 weeks, in each month of the sample to adjacent later weeks.
The data do not enable US to make a distinction between employment and
transition out of the labor force as alternative destinations. But, as Abowd and
Zellner (1985) show, on average, the share of workers becoming employed in the
outflow from unemployment is larger than the share of workers leaving the labor
force.
Finally, we use the help wanted index from Citibase as a cyclical indicator
c(7).  Data on this indicator are plotted in Figure 1.
4 Estimation results
4.1 Parameter estimates
Table 1 contains estimates of four different specifications of ow baseline  model.
The first column contains estimates of the most flexible  model, where cl(t)  is as-
sumed to have a quadratic specification.  The second  and third column show esti-
mates  of models in which we restricted <l(t)  = log(t  + 1) and <Z(T)  = log++(T):
respectively. In the last column, the flexible specification  of logQg,c(T)  as a poly-
nomial is abandoned, and replaced by a more restrictive,  but also more compre-
hensible combination of a linear trend and our business cycle indicator, the help
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wanted index.
Comparing the estimation results of Columns 2-1 with those of Column 1 we
draw  two conclusions. The first conclusion is that many  parameter estimates
are hardly affected by the restrictions imposed. So! the estimated coefficients
are quite robust. The second conclusion, however!  is that the restrictions do
affect the fit of the model to the data. This fellows  from likelihood ratio tests
at conventional levels of significante.  Therefore, we restrict the discussion of the
estimation results to the estimates presented in Column 1 of Table 1.
The differences between the four ao-coefficients  reflect the differences in exit
probabilities between the different groups of unemployed workers. Conditional
on the state  of the business cycle, the season and the duration of unemployment
white female unemployed have the highest exit probability out of unemployment
while black male unemployed have the lowest exit probability. There is obviously
a bigger differente  between males and females than there is between black and
white unemployed. The estimates of the crl-coefficients  indicate  that there is
calendar time  fluctuation in the individual exit probability out of unemployment.
The estimates of @l(t)  imply significant negative duration dependence  at al1
duration classes. As the parameter values of the polynomial are not very infor-
mative on the shape of log @Q  (7)) we have plotted this function in Figure 2. As
explained earlier, log $JZ,~(  )r corresponds to the cycle at t  = t = 0. Comparison
with the help wanted index in Figure 1 indicates  that exit probabilities are pro-
cyclical. This is confirmed by the parameter on the help wanted index in the
fourth estimate, which is significantly positive. So, in upswings  of the economy
unemployment durations get shorter:  in downswings they get longer.
The ws-coefficients  indicate  to what extent there is seasonal fluctuation in the
exit probability. It appears that there are seasonal fluctuations of this kind, the
exit probability in the third yuarter being the highest and in the first quarter
being the lowest. Labor market conditions seem to be most favorable in the sum-
mer months. The estimated ws-coefficients  indicate  that there is also seasonal
variation in the exit probability caused  by seasonal variation in the quality of the
inflow conditional on the other determinants of the unemployment exit probabil-
ity. Unemployed who  enter in the third quarter have the lowest exit probability
while those entering in the first quarter have the highest exit probability. The
reason for this might be that the incidence is largest in the third quarter and
smallest  in the first quarter. So, unemployed entering in the third quarter  face
a lot of competition, mhile for those entering the first quarter competition is less
sevese.
Interaction effects are generally significant. Interaction is significantly nega-
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tive in the first month, and significantly positive in later months. Figure 3 plots
log cycles and duration dependence (log[ljll(t)~q:c(7)1C13,i(t,  T)])  in the exit proba-
bilities by duration class. Cyclical sensitivity falls between duration classes 0 and
1, but rises  from t.  = 1 onwards. In duration classes 3 and 4, cyclical sensitivity
is higher than in duration class 0. Figure 4 offers a different angle by plotting
duration dependence in log exit probabilities at tg(~)  = 0.20 and [P(T) = -0.20,
which roughly correspond to a boom and a recession period. In a boom, duration
dependence is relatively high in the first month, but relatively low in the later
months. We conclude that sorting is the dominant process in the first two months
of unemployment. Ranking dominates at higher durations.
The baseline  calendar time  cycle (~2’s)  and the cycle in the interaction effect
(as’s)  are in phase in the entire data period. Thus, we find  no evidente  of
asymmetries of the interaction effect of the business cycle. However,  as is shown
by Figure 2, both cycles closely track each other in the first half of the data
period, whereas the interaction cycle is substantially lower in the 1980s. We
interpret this remarkable shift as a movement towards less duration dependence
at low durations and more duration dependence at higher durations in the early
1980s.
4.2 The composition of the inflow
So far, we have not allowed for cyclical fluctuations depending on the moment
of inflow, r - t:  other than shifts in the shares of males  and females and blacks
and whites. Such  fluctuations may be caused by changes  in the composition
of the inflow into unemployment over the business cycle. As indicated in the
introduction the literature is not clear about the importante  of this effect.
As argued before, interaction between duration and cycle can  be due to
changes  in the composition of the inflow across the cycle. We will now attempt
to inquire  to what extent  this is true. As a robustness test of our model, and
with the qualifications of Appendix C, we have re-estimated both the preferred
flexible model in Column 1 of Table 1 and the model with +!J~,~(T)  depending on
the help wanted index, allowing in both models for variation of $Q(T  - t)  over
the business cycle. We specify +Q(T-  t)  = exp(&c(T-  t)), where c(~ -t)  is again
the help wanted index. Because of the non-identification of an exponential trend
in lu3&  - t>! we do not add a linear trend term, nor do we specify $J~,~(T -  t)  as
a polynomial series in r -  t.
Table 2 shows the estimation results. Both specifications produce  strong pro-
cyclical effects  of changes  in the composition of the inflow on the exit probability
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from unemployment, which is consistent with the results of Darby, Haltiwanger
and Plant (1985). T he average quality of the inflow in booms is higher t.han  the
average quality of the inflow in slumps. Because of this the average duration of
unemployment in booms is shorter than the average  duration in slumps? even if
individual unemployment durations distributions do not change.
Most parameter estimates are not strongly affected by the introduction of
cyclical variation in the composition of the inflow. The dummies for the demo-
graphic  groups! the duration dependence estimates, the seasonal effects in the
outflow and the seasonal effects due to the composition of the inflow are practi-
cally  the same. The coefficients of the interaction effects are somewhat affected,
but the result  that there is negative interaction for lower duration classes and pos-
itive interaction for higher duration classes does not change. Only the coefficients
of the calendar time effect in the outflow seem to be affected. The coefficient of
the help-wanted index is 35% smaller in the second column of Table  2 than it is
in the corresponding column of Table  1. So, allowing for compositional variation
in the inflow reduces t,he estimated instantaneous calendar time  effects in the
outflow. Still, a substantial cyclical variation is left in the instantaneous effect
on the outflow from unemployment. Since the coefficients ,&  and ,& have about
the same size we conclude that the instantaneous effect of calendar time  and the
composition effect are about the same.
5 Decomposition of unemployment dynamics
So far, we have studied the nature  of interaction between the business cycle and
exit probabilities from unemployment in isolation from the incidence!  and the
leve1 of unemployment itself. In this section,  we investigate the role of the busi-
ness cycle, duration dependence, and interaction in explaining fluctuations of the
aggregate unemployment rate.  Point of departure are the estimation results from
Table  1, Column 1. In Subsection 5.1 we focus on the most basic  decomposition
of unemployment in incidence and duration. Subsection 5.2 then zooms in on the
role  of compositional effects.
5.1 Incidence versus duration
From the definition of the exit probability we can derive a decomposition of
unemployment at calendar time T,
4 (7) = 4 (0; 4 + -fy ug (0; 7- - t) tjj (1 - eg (i; j- _ t + q> .t.=l i=o
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In steady state,  when al1 variables are constant over calendar time  r!  this decom-
position reduces to
[
m t-1
poll = 4 (0) 1 + c JJ (1 - $7  @)> 7
t=1  i=o 1
(23)
where  we have dropped the argument r for obvious reasons. We wil1  refer to
the number of newly unemployed as unemployment ‘incidence’ and to the term
between brackets  as unemployment ‘duration’.
Equation  (23) implies that, in a steady state,  relative changes of the unem-
ployment rate  equal the sum of relative changes in unemployment incidence and
relative changes in unemployment duration. In turn, changes in unemployment
durations are one-to-one related to the exit probabilities from unemployment.
For example, in absente  of duration dependence-  say that the exit probability
equals some constant 8,-  unemployment duration is the reciprocal of this prob-
ability. In that specific  case, unemployment is given by Ug  (0) /8, . Then!  the
(partial) elasticities of unemployment with respect to the incidence and the exit
probability equal 1 and -1, respectively. Obviously, equation (22) shows that,
out of steady state,  unemployment adjusts slowly to changes in the incidence
and the exit probability. Furthermore, compared to the comparative  static  ef-
fects, transitory changes in the underlying components  only partially translate in
changes in unemployment .
Three hurdles have to be taken before we can use our estimation results of the
interaction model of unemployment duration from Subsection 4.1 to decompose
fluctuations in the aggregate unemployment rate.
First, we have to incorporate  data on the size  of the labor force for which we
use CPS data on group g (al1  groups) , say Ls (7)  (L(r)) ) and 12-month  moving
averages of these statistics,  say ,&(Í-)  (L,(T)), to transform cyclical and trend
fluctuations in unemployment into unemployment rate  fluctuations.
Second,  we need data on incidence before we can apply (22). As we want to
separate seasonal effects from longer run developments in the incidence, incidence
is also modeled as the product of a seasonal and a long run term,
where  wg,*(7)  and $~~,d,~ (7) are specified like the seasonal and cyclical terms in
the interaction model. TYote  that we specify different models for different de-
mographic groups to allow  for shifts in the shares of these groups  in the inflow
into unemployment. An empirical specification  can be found by recalling (‘7)  for
f.  = 0, and taking logs: 1ogG  (01~)  = IogU,  (01~)  + logz,:,?,.  Estimated cycles
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in the incidence rate,  log~~,4,c(T)/Lg,,(~)!  are plotted in Figure 5. A compari-
son with Figure 1 learns that incidence is countercyclical, with male incidence
being the most sensitive to the cycle. Furthermore, there is a shift towards a
higher proportion of males in the inflow into unemployment. This even holds
after  correction for the increased share of females in the labor force. Clearly,
both developments may have an impact on aggregate unemployment, as males
have longer unemployment durations.
Third, as mentioned in Section  3, we have not modeled exit probabilities for
high duration classes. Consequently, we can not simulate [i,(r)  as it is given by
equation  (22). Instead, we wil1  focus on unemployment in the first six duration
classes, or  more precisely, on the rate  of unemployment in the first six duration
classes, ~(7)  = C,  Cf=,  Ug(tl~)/L(~).  Appendix B provides details on the de-
composition procedure. So, in the remainder of this subsection where we use
the term ‘unemployment rate’  we in fact  mean  the unemployment rate  based on
the first 6 months of unemployment, which includes approximately 90-95%  of al1
unemployment spells.
We graphically illustrate the importante  of the various components  of un-
employment dynamics.  To start with, Figure 6 shows that the evolution of the
actual unemployment rate  is wel1  represented by the cyclical part of the estimated
model.
Figure 7 shows the effect of omitting the interaction  cycle from the estimated
model. It appears that the amplitudes of the cycle are somewhat larger without
the interaction cycle. Figure 7 also shows that the amplitude of the unemploy-
ment rate  cycle is reduced by approximately one half if we omit both the inter-
action  and the baseline  cycles,  and thus the instantaneous cyclical effect on the
outflow. Figure 8 shows the effect of the incidence on the cyclical pattern of the
unemployment rate.  If the cyclical variation in the incidence is removed the am-
plitude of the cycle again reduces substantially. The contributions of incidence
and duration to the variation of the unemployment rate  over the business cycle
are about the same.
Figure 9 compares the full cycle fluctuations in the unemployment rate  with
unemployment rate fluctuations generated in the absente  of duration dependence.
As is explained in Appendix B, the average, or  ‘steady state’,  exit probability
is fixed at a value that generates the same (truncated) expected duration as the
original set of exit probabilities averaged over calendar time.  The interaction
effects are switched off. Almost  al1 of the, fairly small,  changes in the cyclical
pattern of the unemployment rate  appear to be due to fixing the interaction effect.
Clearly, individual duration dependence  per se is only of second  order importante
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compared to the driving changes in incidence and overall outflow probabilities.
5.2 Comp osit ional variat ion and aggregat e unemployment
We Capture part of the cyclical variation in the composition of the inflow by al-
lowing for a changing demographic composition of unemployment incidence. We
Capture the remaining variation, which by itself is unobserved, by introducing
a relationship between the composition of the inflow and the help-wanted index
(see Subsection 4.2). Figure 10 shows the effect of hing  the demographic com-
position of the inflow. As could be expected from the observed time  pattern of
the male-female incidence shares and the differente  between male and female exit
probabilities, variation in the composition of the inflow explains some of both the
cyclical fluctuations in and the secular  rise of unemployment. This is in conflict
with some of the earlier literature discussed in the introduction. The effect of the
remaining cyclical variation in the composition of the inflow! for which we used
the help-wanted index as an indicator! is more difficult to illustrate. Basically
the help-wanted index is only indirectly related to the composition of the inflow.
Whereas there is a direct relation between the help-wanted index and the outflow
from unemployment because of the matching process  between job vacanties  and
unemployed, in case of the composition of the inflow the help-wanted index is
just an indicator. There is no reason why the composition of the inflow would be
in any way related to the number of job vacanties.  Therefore, we can only tenta-
tively indicate  the effect of the unobserved cyclical variation in the composition
of the inflow. As shown in Tables  1 and 2 the introduction of a compositional
effect connected to the help-wanted index reduces the direct effect of the busi-
ness cycle on the unemployment exit rate. Both effects have about the same
magnitude which implies that the two competing explanations of fluctuations in
average unemployment duration are in fact  equally valid.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we present a full and integrated decomposition of U.S. unemploy-
ment dynamics. In some respects  we get conventional results, in other respects
we get brand-new results. And, our results are achieved within a very genera1
modelling framework.
We find  that unemployment durations at the individual leve1  are shorter in
booms and longer in slumps. Furthermore, unemployment incidence is coun-
tercyclical:  while the changing composition of the inflow has procyclical effects.
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Thus, cyclical variations in U.S. unemployment are driven by the combined  effects
of variations in individual exit probabilities, incidence and a changing composi-
tion of the inflow into unemployment. Variations in unemployment duration seem
to explain about half of al1 variations, while the incidence explains the other half.
The cyclical variations in unemployment duration themselves are caused by both
an instantaneous effect and by the effect of a changing composition of the inflow
into unemployment. Roughly speaking, both account for about half of the dura-
tion effect. It should however  be noted that the compositional effect, to the extent
in which it concerns unobserved characteristics, is identified from functional form
restrictions.
There are also substantial seasonal fluctuations in 5.S.  unemployment. Exit
probabilities are low in the first and high in the third quarter. Furthermore!  un-
employed entering in the first quarter have relatively short unemployment spells,
whereas unemployed entering in the third quarter experience relatively long spells.
As unemployment incidence is relatively smal1  in the first and large in the third
quarter, we conclude that this may be related to competition among unemployed.
Finally, we find that the individual exit probabilities out  of unemployment
decline over the duration of the unemployment spell. This negative duration
dependence  is a quantitatively unimportant determinant of unemployment vari-
ation.
We establish that sorting is the dominant exilanation  of the observed in-
teraction between the business cycle and duration in the first two months of
unemployment . Consequently, at low durations the cyclical sensitivity of exit
probabilities increases with duration. At higher durations, however,  the sign of
this interaction effect changes,  and cyclical sensitivity increases fast with dura-
tion.  It turns out that this is only consistent with the presence of ranking. It
should be noted that the interaction effect, to the extent in which it cannot be at-
tributed to a changing composition, is a quantitatively unimportant determinant
of unemployment variation across the cycle.
From the perspective of our model of sorting and ranking we conclude that
there is considerable  heterogeneity in unemployment duration distributions be-
tween labor  market segments. Clearly, this leaves some scope for identifying seg-
ments and directing labor  market polities  to those segments that perform badly.
On top of this, our analysis shows that, even at a high leve1 of aggx-egation,  within
market ranking eventually dominates sorting effects, and is thus of considerable
importante  as well. The institutional structure  of the current U.S. unemployment.
benefit  system seems to account for the consequences  of the ranking phenomenon
because the length of the unemployment benefit  entitlement period depends on
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the business cycle. Labor market polities  directed at long term unemployment
in genera1 can be beneficial. Furthermore, even if ranking is not induced by sub-
stantial loss of skills, it may demotivate long term unemployed, and thus cal1
for similar polities.  As ranking is associated with limited adjustment of wages
to unemployment, such polities  could also be effective in reducing persistente  of
unemployment at the aggregate level.
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Appendices
A The sorting process
This appendix provides details on the sorting model in discrete time.  We use
discrete duration t and discrete calendar time  r,  measured on the time scales
introduced  in Subsection 2.3. Let c7 denote the value of the business cycle
indicator at calendar time  r,  and let 29(tjcT,u)  now denote the exit probabil-
ity from unemployment  at calendar time r and duration t. Assume that G(z!)
is absolutely continuous, and denote the density of w  by g(v). We again as-
sume that Pr[O  < d(tl C,,ZI) < l] = 1 and &(c,,t)/&,  > 0. Denote V(T:  t) =
lE[w~{c}T-~,t  2 t], where  {c}~-I  = {. . . ,cT-2,c7-1}.  The conditional survivor
function is given by S(tjT,w) := Pr(t  1 tl{c}T-l,u)  = n~~~(l - q(~~-~+~~i)w),
where we adopt the convention n~-..~  zi = 1. The unconditional survivor func-
tion equals S(tlT) = lE[S(t~~,~)] = lE[nflA(l  -v(~-~+i,i)v)],  where  expectations
are taken with respect to G(v), unless conditioning is explicitly  denoted. The
distribution of ZJ conditional on survival up to t is given by
Pr(v  5 8/{c}+l,t  2 t) =
Pr  (v I 0 2 tl{+-1)
s w>
Jo”  s (tlv)  dG (4=
Wl3 -
Therefore, the conditional density of w,  say g(vlr,  t 2 t),  is given by
g(‘L’17,t  2 t) = s(t’T7u)g(v)
s w
rr:r;  (1  - 77(G-t+i,  +J>
= IE [r-g;  (1  - O(CT-t+i,i)V)]
g (w)
*
cw
(26)
Thus, the k-th moment of U,  conditional on survival up to time  t, is given by
E [vLl{c},-~,t 2 t] =
IE  [w”  n;r;  (1 -  q(cT-t+i,  i)V)]
IE  [n:=o  (1  -  ~(C,_t+i,i)v)]  .
cw
Now!  impose steady state  on rj(c7, t), such that q(c7,  t) = q(c)  for each r and t:
and some constant c = c,  , and ~(7,  t) = V(C, t). T hen, we can use equation  (27)
to show that
29
:
Then:  duration dependence between duration classes t and t + 1 can be charac-
terized by v(c,  t + 1) -  v(c,  t). It. can be shown that
Wc)
u(c,  t + 1) - u(c,  t) = -v(c)sct  + llc)var(wIc, t 2 t). (29)
Thus!  if the (conditional) variante  of c is strictly positive, the expected value
of v falls between cohorts  in duration classes t and t + 1. This is the familiar
result  that unobserved heterogeneity generates negative duration dependence in
observed exit probabilities. The marginal effect of a change in c on duration
dependence between 0 and t is given by
(30)
which is weakly smaller than 0 as E [u2/c,  t 2 t - l] > lE [‘UIC,  t 2 t - 11~  and
q(c)lE  [w21c,  t 2 t - l] < E [vlc,  t 2 t - l] (Shohat and Tamarkin, 1943, and Akhiezer,
1965). If the first inequality holds strictly, i.e. if var(uIc,  2 t - 1) > 0, the inter-
action  effect is strictly negative, which proves the claim in the main  text.
Finally,  note that qualitatively similar results can be derived in a continuous
time sorting model. Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1997) provide details.
B Details on the decomposition
The decomposition in Section  5 is computed  as follows. Note that we can log-
transform (9) and (24) into
4 @Ir) = ao,g  + $1  (t) + && (7) + wz (7)
+43,c  (T -  t> -t z3 (T -  t)  + $3,i  (t, 7)  and
Q?W) = q&) + $g,4,c(T): (31)
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where bars denote logs. In the decompositional exercises, one or more terms
in (31) are fixed over calendar time,  or,  in case of the incidence, fixed between
groups . Furthermore? in some cases, duration dependence is ked  at a steady
state  level. Suppose:  we want to simulate U(tl~)  for t = O?.  . . , nt.  and T =
To . . . TO + n7 -  1 . We  can distinguish the following cases:
1.  Let &,i(*,  T>  := ntl  Et  &,i(t,  7) and Q,i(t,  .)  := n;l  C, $CtQai(tr  -r).  If inter-
action  effects are  excluded,  @s,i(t, T)/[$Js,~(.,  ~)p!~3~~(t,  .)]  is fixed at its overall
geometrie  duration and calendar time mean.  Alternatively, we could  say
that &,i(t,~)  -  $z+(*, T) -  &,i(t,  .)  is Fred  at its mean.
2. If seasonal effects are excluded: W,(T),  L&(T  -  t)  and W,(T)  are Fred  at their
respective  means. Similarly, if cyclical effects on the composition or  the
size  of the inflow are excluded, q3,C(~  -  t) and q4,C(~)  are Fred  at their
mean values, respectively. In case ~!J&T) is fixed, LC(7)  is also fixed at its
geometrie  mean.
3. If cyclical effects on the outflow are excluded J&~(T)  + v&~(.,  7)  is fked  at
its mean  value: and interaction effects are fixed as explained before.
4. If we fix al1 functions but duration dependence, $l(t)+g,+(t,  a),  at their geo-
metric means,  we can compute a series of ‘steady state’  exit probabilities
t?,(t), for  t = o, . . . , nt  -  1. If we exclude duration dependence from our
simulations, we again fix interaction effects, and fix the ‘steady state’  exit
probability series at the single leve1 that corresponds to the same (trun-
cated) expected duration as the ‘steady state’  series eg(t), t = 0,. . . , *nt  - 1.
Thus, for each group g, we try to find  a single real root 0 < es  < 1 of
nt t - 1
1 + c fl  [l -  es  (i)] = e;’  [l  -  (1 -  fQn,+l]  . (32)
t=1 i=o
Then,  we fix &(t) +&(t,  -)  at ëg minus the group specific  geometrie  mean
of e,(W  - &(t>  -  &(t,  *).
5. Finally, we fìx the shares of observed groups in the inflow by first comput-
ing average shares, say sg, of each group g in the geometrie  mean  of the
incidence. Then, we compute a representative incidence cycle from & $i&.
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C Identification and the interpretation of the
interaction effect
Recall from Subsection 2.3 that our model is given by
re  (W  = exp (Qo)  $1  (t)  7b2,c  (7)  $734  (7  - t)  y93,i  (t, T)  ) (33)
where we drop the subscript g and seasonal effects for the moment. Our model
is fully identified if we can  uniquely determine cro,  Ql(t),  ~,LJQ(T),  Q3,C(7  -  t)>
and &,i(t,~),  for al1 i: 2 0 and r 2 ro. In this appendix we show under which
conditions our model is identified.
As argued before, our decomposition is very flexible,  allowing not only for
duration and calendar time  dependence, but also for interaction effects between
duration dependence and calendar time,  and dependence on the moment of inflow.
To identify the model only one additional assumption is required.12
We have to rule out specifications of $3,C(~  -  t)  from which a multiplica-
tive exponential trend can be separated. Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours
(1994) show that without this restriction, @l(t)  and $~g,~(r)  on the one hand, and
$~(7  - t)  on the other, cannot be separated. l3  Therefore, the minimum assump-
tion that we have to make is that ?&(T  - t) does not contain 2111  exponential
trend. This assumption seems fairly innocuous. In fact:  in our baseline  analysis
we assume that there is no long run variation in the composition of the inflow
into unemployment. Subsequently, in an additional analysis we investigate an
alternative specification,  in which 7&(~  - t) is allowed to vary over the cycle.
12Note  that we can arbitrarily normalize 4 of the 5 components  of the r.h.s. of (33):  say
by putting &(q  = $2(F)  = T+!J~,~(?  - q = $3,i(f,T)  = 1. Then, QO  accounts  for the scale
of O(tl~),  and O(?l-)  q 1T e uas exp(cro).  Also note that in Subsection 2.3 we restricted the func-
tional farm  of $3,i(t>  T)  to satisfy $3,i(fY T) = ?,&(t, 7) = 1. Without this assumption, $s,i(t:~)
is allowed to contain a multiplicative  component that  only  depen&  on  t,lx  moment  of in-
flow  7 - t.  Clearly, such a factor cannot be distinguished from &JT  - t). It can easily
be seen  that  the indeterminacy is solved by this assumption. Suppose that we have a model
{~l(t),~2(7),~3,c(T-t):~3,i(t>T)}.  N OW, let ‘$3,c(T-t)  G 1 and qs,i(t, T) = ‘$‘3,i(t,T)$J3,c(T-t).
Ckarly,  ?Z3,i(t,T)  is indeed  a function of t and T for which &(t,T)  = 1. It can easily  be seen
that our Original  model and {-l(t), +~(T),?+&(T  - t),  ?&(t,T)} are observationally equivalent.
However,  the specification  of $s,i(t,T) violates the new assumption, unless $+(7 - t) = 1 for
al1 7 - t.
13Su~h  specifications can be characterized by /L(T  - t) exp[y(T  - t)],  with  h(~  - t)  non-
~nUltipkatiVe  iI1  T a n d  t.  Clearly,  if $J~,~(T  -t) could be separated this way, a model
{~l(t).,~2(T),,~3,c(T-t):,~~3,i(t,T)}  with duration dependence &(t) = &(t) exp(-yt), calendar
time  dependence ?&(T)  = $2,=(~)  exp(y-r), and moment of inflow dependence q&(~  - t) =
/2(7  - t)  would  be  observational  equivalent to a model {~I(t)?~~2(~),~~3,c(~  - t),q!~~,~(t~~)}.
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We end this subsection by discussing the interpretation of the interaction
effect $a,i(t,  -r)  as representation of the dynamic  effects of ranking and sorting.
From the sorting model of Subsection 2.2 we know that interaction effects stem-
ming from sorting concern interaction between the leve1 of the exit probability!
represented by the cycle c, and duration dependence. In a model in which the
exit probabilities do not depend on the moment of inflow in the longer run?  and
thus $a,C(r  -  t)  E 1, this can easily be translated in terms of the empirical model:
the role of the cycle c is taken by $19C( )r , so this function should somehow enter
in the interaction effect. Then, if $2.C(~)  is high, exit probabilities are high, and
any existing sorting effects are stronger. The converse holds for ranking.
However,  if the longer run leve1 of the exit probabilities depends on both the
outflow cycle $Q  (7) and the inflow cycle &+(r  -  t)  it is the cumulative  effect
of both these cycles that matters. Both in the top of the inflow and in the top
of outflow cycle, the exit probabilities wil1  be relatively large, and any sorting
effects wil1  be strong. As the overall leve1 of the exit probabilities matters for the
interaction effect, both cycles should appear in the interaction term.
Thus, in designing a parameterization of the model of Subsection 2.3, we either
have to rule out  cyclical fluctuations in the composition of the inflow, or  allow  for
sufficient flexibility in the dependence of @s,i(t, 7)  on calender  time  r. Sufficient
flexibility is achieved if the interaction effect is able to Capture interaction between
the overall leve1 of the exit probabilities and duration dependence.
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Table 1: Interaction model; estimation results
observed individual characteristics
QObf -0.G3  (0.01) -0.G5  (0.02) -0.63 (0.01) -0.57 (0.01)
~0l.m -0.71 (0.01) -0.73 (0.02) -0.71 (0.01) -0.G.5  (0.01)
"Owf 1 -0.59 (0.01) 1 -0.61 (0.02) 1 -0.59 (0.01) 1 -0.53 (0.01)
baseline  duration dependence
Th1 1 -0.21 (0.02) 1--0.17  (0.02) 1 -0.19 (0.01) 1 -0.21 (0.01)
7412 -0.39 (0.02) -0.35 (0.03) -0.38 (0.01) -0.38 (0.02j
$13 -0.62 (0.02) -0.59 (0.03) -0.64 (0.02) -0.58 (0.02)
$54 -1.12 (0.06) -1.15 (0.05) -1.23 (0.04) -1.06 (0.04)
baseline  cycle outflow-
(help wanted
-0.12 (0.01)
0.04 (0.01)
-0.06 (0.01)
-0.05 (0.01)
-0.04 (0.01)
-0.02 (0.01)
0.03 (0.01)
0.02 (0.01)
0.02 (0.01)
-0.02 (0.01)
0.04 (0.01)
0.04 (0.01)
-0.04 (0.01)
-0.00 (0.00)
0.03 (0.01)
--
d4
-0.09 (0.04)
0.03 (0.03)
-0.05 (0.03)
-0.03 (0.03)
-0.03 (0.03)
-0.01 (0.02)
0.01 (0.03)
0.00 (0.02)
0.01 (0.02)
-0.02 (0.02)
0.01 (0.01)
0.01 (0.01)
-0.03 (0.01)
-0.00 (0.01)
0.01 (0.01)
-0.08 (0.01)
0.04 (0.01)
-0.04 (0.01)
-0.03 (0.01)
-0.02 (0.01)
-0.01 (0.01)
0.03 (0.01)
0.02 (0.01)
0.01 (0.00)
-0.02 (0.00)
0.03 (0.00)
0.03 (0.00)
-0.03 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)
0.02 (0.00)
0.76 (0.06)
-0.12 (0.01)
seasonal effect outflow
J22 0.07 (0.01) 0.08 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01)
w23 0.21 (0.01) 0.21 (0.01) 0.21 (0.01) 0.21 (0.01)
w24 0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)
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Table 1: (Continued)
seasonal effect composition inílow
LJ32 -0.05 (0.01) -0.05 (0.01) -0.05 (0.01) -0.05 (0.01)
w33 -0.11 (0.01) -0.11 (0.01) -0.11 (0.01) -0.11 (0.01)
w3-L -0.09 (0.01) -0.09 (0.01) -0.09 (0.01) -0.09 (0.01)
interaction; duration parameters
<lO -0.37 (0.09) -0.13 (0.09) -0.30 (0.10)
Cl1 0.4G (0.12) 0.41 (0.08) 0.65 (0.09)
interaction: cvcle  D~LI
-0.17’ iO.06jQ31
CL32 0.01 (0.08)
a33 O.OG  (0.04)
Q34 -0.05 (0.07)
035 0.01 (0.03)
a36 -0.03 (0.06)
Q3ï 0.06 (0.04)
Q‘38 0.07 (0.04)
a39 0.06 (0.05)
a310 0.03 (0.03)
a311 0.07 (0.04)
a312 0.08 (0.03)
a313 0.00 (0.03)
a314 -0.02 (0.02)
Q1315 0.11 (0.04)
measurement errors
abm 0.23 (0.00) 0.23 (0.00) 0.23 (0.00) 0.24 (0.00)
Obf 0.23 (0.00) 0.23 (0.00) 0.23 (0.00) 0.24 (0.00)
~wm 0.14 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00) 0.15 (0.00)
Qwf 0.13 (0.00) 0.13 (0.00) 0.13 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00)
AJ 288 x 4 x 5 288 x 4 x 5 288 x 4 x 5 288 4 5x x
log .c 8135.11 8099.00 8102.50 7819.42
ramet ers
-0.01 (0.04)
0.02 (0.03)
-0.01 (0.04)
-0.02 (0.02)
-0.00 (0.03)
-0.01 (0.02)
0.03 (0.03)
0.02 (0.02)
0.00 (0.02)
-0.01 (0.01)
0.04 (0.02)
0.04 (0.01)
-0.02 (0.01)
0.00 (0.01)
0.01 (0.01)
-0.30 (0.10)
0.05 (0.15)
1.04 (0.21)
2.69 (0.35)
Note: standard errors  .in  parentheses.
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Table 2: Interaction model with cyclical dependence inflow: estimation results
observed individual characteristics
~
baseline  duration dependence
El:
baseline  cycle outflow
P2 (help wanted index)
0.49 (0.07)
Q21 -0.15 (0.01) -0.19 (0.02)
Q22 0.05 (0.01)
a23 - 0 . 0 2  ( 0 . 0 1 )
Q24 -0.03 (0.01)
a25 -0.02 (0.01)
a26 -0.01 (0.01)
Q27 0.00 (0.01)
a28 0.00 (0.01)
Q29 0.01 (0.01)
ff210 -0.01 (0.01)
Q211 0.03 (0.01)
0212 0.00 (0.01)
0213 -0.01 (0.01)
0214 0.00 (0.00)
a215 0.01 (0.01)
seasonal  effect outflow
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Table 2: (Continued)
I \ I, \ /
seasonal effect composition inflow
w32 -0.05 (0.01) -0.04 (0.01)
w33 -0.11 (0.01) -0.11 (0.01)
w34 1 -0.09 (0.01) 1 -0.10 (0.01)
interaction; duration parameters
GO -0.49 (0.41) -0.91 (0.07)
511 0.64 (0.52) 1.10 (0.07)
%!Z~ ~~~~:~;  B
interaction; cycle parameters
a31 -0.12 (0.11)
a32 0.01 (0.03)
a33 0.05 (0.05)
034 -0.03 (0.04)
035 0.01 (0.03)
cu36 -0.02 (0.03)
a37 0.05 (0.05)
a38 0.06 (0.05)
a39 0.05 (0.05)
0310 0.02 (0.03)
ff311 0.06 (0.06)
Q312 0.05 (0.05)
ff313 -0.00 (0.02)
a314 -0.01 (0.02)
a315 0.07 (0.06)-
measurement errors
T
N 288 x 4 x 5 288 x 4 x 5
log L 8180.53 7834.93
Note: standard  ernors ,in  parentheses.
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Figure  1: Help wanted index
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Figure 3: Cycles  by duration
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Figure 5: Cycle unemployment  incidence rate  by demographic group
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Figure 6: Unemployment rates;  fitted series and data
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Figure 7: Unemployment rate;  full cycle and without cycle outflow
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Figure 9: Unemployment rate;  full cycle and without duration dependence
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Figure 10: Unemployment rate;  full cycle and with constant composition inflow.
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